No. Sorry, Hume. Why? Let’s examine the types of things we’re looking at:
Is: Facts, truths, things we know about the world, the positive, the descriptive
Ought: Things we ought to do, things we should do, the normative, the prescriptive
If we’re not Bill Clinton, when we talk about what is, we can point to things. We can show the results of scientific testing, the pictures taken with the Hubble telescope, the flower, the tree, the book, whatever. Even if the subject of discussion isn’t physically tangible, there is a referent for that which is.
The definitions I have of ought, though, are kind of useless. They’re basically just synonyms, dancing around each other without telling us anything new about the concept of ‘ought.’ That’s a big red flag for there being nothing behind all the language, and I hold that there isn’t. If ‘ought’ existed somewhere out there, it would be a different kind of thing than anything we’ve ever seen or studied. What do normative statements look like, anyway? Unconditional imperatives, those statements that call us to take action based on no particular condition aside from perhaps existence, are based on lies. There are no ‘shoulds’ floating around in the universe. Atoms don’t come with <good> and <bad> xml tags. There are no goodons, or categorical imperatives.
That doesn’t mean that what is, is good, nor does it mean that all morality relative. It only means that the only things in the entire world that give humans reasons for doing things are our values, those things we want and desire. We take action because we want to. Living is valuable because we want to live. Happiness is valuable because we want to be happy. There’s nothing else to base ‘shoulds’ on. There is only merely real desires. And those desires are ‘is’s. We can study them, we can count them, we can in theory measure them. They live inside our brains, we experience them as attractions and repulsions, we can reason about them, change them and explain them. From this we can construct theories of objective morality and plans for the future of robot morality.
[Added later for clarity:] It may still be useful to make a conceptual distinction between those things which are facts about the world and those things which are facts about how we would like the world to be. But there isn’t a rigorous philosophical distinction.
Is there an Is/Ought Distinction? No, because Ought is merely a type of Is.